Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wright, Crispin
 
Books on Amazon
Nonfactualism I 272ff
Non-Factualism/Boghossian/Wright:> then no discourse can be more than correct - (i) it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition. - WrightVs: this can be reformulated with disquotation into
(vi) it is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition.
But denying the truth is not inconsistent with correctness of the assertion - but (i) is incorrect, if both truth and correctness are in the game, the matrix for the truth predicate must be non-conservative: i.e. the value of A is true in all cases, false or incorrect, except those where A has the truth value true. - ((s) Non-conservatism requires truth, not just correctness, > truth transfer.)

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Nonfactualism



back to list view | > Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29