Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M.J. Cresswell on Necessity - Dictionary of Arguments
Hughes I 258 Truth/necessity/Hughes/Cresswell: one can be convinced that there are records for which it is logically true that they are a contingent truth. That should be expressed by a system: "Existence postulate"/Lewis/Langford: (Ep) (Eq) (~ (p strimp q) ~ (p ~ strimp q)). Explanation: "strimp": strict implication. >Contingency, >Logical necessity, >Logical possibility, >Logical truth, >Truth, >Facts, >Systems, >Modal properties._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18