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Quine: Ontology only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object
VsEvent ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier-theory": no events, not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus.
Jaegwon Kim: Identify events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of characteristics.
II 121 et seq
Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Distinguishing between event token and description.
Quine: "No entity without identity"
The radical interpretation does not necessarily lead to uniform ontologies for all speakers.
Ontological categories: for Davidson persons, material objects, events.
Ontology/Davidson: as a superordinate principle, is necessary whenever we recognize a grammatical category to which we must assign an infinite number of expressions - so we need events and objects: objects allow us to get adjectives under control - events: the same for some adverbs.
Ontology/Davidson/Glüer: Thesis: People, material objects, events. Question: could these ontological categories vary? - No, probably not so that different sorting makes sense.
Ontology/mental/physical/Davidson: is description-independent. - intentionalist as well as physical discourse are based on the same event ontology.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990