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Logic/Ontology/Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptually necessary" - from a conceptual explanation. - If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx - FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God - Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...".
Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of the mind/Field: in the philosophy of the mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology.
Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it).
I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. (s). That is, the assumption that the nonobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist).
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980