Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Field, Hartry
 
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Ontology I 166
Logic/Ontology/Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptually necessary" - from a conceptual explanation. - If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx - FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God - Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...".
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II 102
Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of the mind/Field: in the philosophy of the mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology.
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III 3
Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it).
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III 4
I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. (s). That is, the assumption that the nonobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30