|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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Existence/Quine: doubtful: "There are terms that...", "some of these propositions...", "there is something that he doubts..." - meaningless: talking about two different meanings of "there is" for abstract and concrete objects - but of one single meaning of object.
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: each behavior is more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore acceptable - but not approved in ontology - unlike geometrical object: Position of mass points had no meaning - therefore not individuable, no identity! > §52
Ontology: in the end only words at all (names of objects) - but accpetance of ideal objects is no linguistic convention.
Ontology that consisted only of materials and bodies would be very vague - but precision is just a question of classification.
Numbers/ontology: Numbers merely "facon de parler" - higher classes needed to replace numbers - otherwise only physical object.
Ontology/Quine: the phrase "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" does not decide between competing O - we do not consider the variables to find out what there is! - The variable shows what a statement asserts - Problem: I cannot admit that there are things that the other one accepts and I do not - deviations in the O involve those in the conceptual scheme - the upper links of the object language can be shared by counterparties and make discussion of language possible -> semantic ascent.
Ontology/Translation/Quine: we cannot find ontological definitions for totally foreign languages.
Ontology/Quine: a theory may even include entities that are indefinable in the same theory.
Economical ontology/Quine: predicates instead of properties - sentences instead of propositions.
Pythagorean ontology/Pythagorism/Quine: a pythagorean ontology consists only of objects of one type, for example numbers or quantities or bodies - one could get these with Loewenheim - Quine: that should be avoided -" problem: after reduction an infinite range might still remain - some numbers lose their number property -" but we do not know which -" Solution: Ontological Relativity: it is useless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms - including that "all are numbers" - Solution:. relativistic theory - just as there is no absolute location or absolute speed - problem: we need to specify a proxy function for a reduction and that is not possible with the axiom of choice (the strong form of Loewenheim) - "a proxy function from above-countable to countable range is impossible because of the lack reversibility.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003