Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Person, philosophy: A thinking and sentient being that distinguishes itself from others. In the course of the history of philosophy, further determinations have been agreed on or disregarded, e.g. rationality, autonomy, not-being-able-to-be-possessed. While the human and his body age, the person has no temporal stages. See also individual, law, continuants, identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Person - Dictionary of Arguments
I 131 Definition person/Strawson: type of entity to which can be attributed both: states of consciousness and physical properties. >Attribution, >Properties, >Consciousness, >Body. I 132 "simple, pure" subject cannot be fundamental concept, because we cannot get from there to others and also not to self-attribution. >Subject, >Self-ascription. I 133 Person/Strawson: The word "I" refers to something, because I am a person among others - the concept of the person is logically primary against the concept of the individual consciousness. >I, Ego, Self/Strawson, >Intersubjectivity, >Community. I 134 Person logical primitive - not secondary to consciousness and body. >Basic concepts. I 134 M-predicates/Strawson: predicate that can be correctly applied to purely mathematical bodies: E.g. "weighs 5 kg" "is in the living room" - P-predicates applicable to persons: E.g. "smile", "suffer pain", "go for a walk", "believe in God". >Predicates/Strawson. I 135 Condition: logical criterion for the application, not only observation. I 135 Strawson: Person/I/subject: not type-ambiguous - only predicates type-ambigous - only persons are attributed both types: P-predicate and M-predicate._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19