Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Strawson, Peter F.
 
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Person I 131
Definition person/Strawson: type of entity to which can be attributed both: states of consciousness and physical properties.
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I 132
"simple, pure" subject cannot be fundamental concept, because we cannot get from there to others and also not to self-attribution.
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I 133
Person/Strawson: The word "I" refers to something, because I am a person among others - the concept of the person is logically primary against the concept of the individual consciousness.
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I 134
Person logical primitive - not secondary to consciousness and body.
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I 134
M-predicates/Strawson: predicate that can be correctly applied to purely mathematical bodies: E.g. "weighs 5 kg" "is in the living room" - P-predicates applicable to persons: E.g. "smile", "suffer pain", "go for a walk", "believe in God".
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I 135
Condition: logical criterion for the application, not only observation.
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I 135
Strawson: Person/I/subject: not type-ambiguous - only predicates type-ambigous - only persons are attributed both types: P-predicate and M-predicate.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25