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|Predicates||Schw I 121
Predicate/Lewis/Schwarz: singles out properties - which ones depends on possible worlds.
Schw I 228
Names/Predicate/Property/Lewis: Thesis: names can name anything: instead of predicate "F" we take "F-ness" predicates are not names and designate nothing - predicate/(s): Not singular terms.
SchwarzVsLewis/RussellVsFrege: assuming that each predicate can be assigned a name for a corresponding property, Russell’s paradox follows -> heterology: no property corresponds to some predicates such as E.g. -is a property that does not apply to itself - Also, nothing that can be named with a singular term corresponds to predicates such as E.g. "is a class" E.g. -is part of- and E.g. -"identical with". - ((s) predicates can always be invented, whether the world contains adequate properties is an empirical question.) - ((s) properties belong to ontology - predicates: belong to ideology (alluding to Quine?)).
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991