Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Schiffer, Stephen
Books on Amazon
Predicates I 235
Predicate/property/realism/Schiffer: realism assumes (erroneously) that predicate and property are in the same relation as name and object. - Vs: there is no entity - "the property to be modest" - solution: the understanding of "Mother Teresa is modest" only requires knowledge of Teresa, not of modesty - properties/Schiffer: do not exist, they are not to find among the things which exist - but: in a loose sense ("there is", substitutional quantification) there are properties. - Nominalism: logical form of "Teresa is modest": Fa instead of Fab - Schiffer: nominalism should nevertheless accept: E.g. "there is something that Teresa has, namely modesty" - but not: E.g. what Al and Betty have in common. - Solution/Schiffer: substitutional quantification: a substitution instance of "Teresa has X" is true.
I 236
There are/exist/substitutional quantification/sQ/Lycan: (1979): Allowes for example: "there are many things that do not exist". E.g. the monster of Loch Ness, etc ...

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29