Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Private language: L. Wittgenstein says it is impossible - you cannot give yourself instructions. You could not even understand the language. See also rule following, Kripke's Wittgenstein, priviledged access, Wittgensteins beetle.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
 
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Private Language Newen/Schrenk I 36
Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: language that is enriched by expressions of private feelings. - Beetle-Example: the thing in the box is not part of the language game - it could also be missing - or constantly changing - a person alone cannot give a meaning.
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Hintikka I 308
Private Language/private/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: - showing, rules can be private but language games cannot.
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I 308/309
Private Language/WittgensteinVsPrivate Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: because you have to understand the whole language-game, not merely its ostensive definition, or the rule for the use of a word, the language cannot be private - if the language games would not take precedence over the rules, private language would be possible.
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I 309
Private language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: understanding only by whole language-game, therefore not purely phenomenological (private).
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I 310
Self-talk: early: only possible if I can already play on the (public) language piano.
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I 311
Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is not about the impossibility of a phenomenological language. - We can encourage ourselves, command, blame, etc. - An external researcher could also translate our self-talk.
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I 314
Private Language/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller/Hintikka: but it is not so that it would be sufficient to only need to pay attention to the role of the utterances in life - as if the private experiences would disappear. -> Beetle-Example: VsStegmüller: Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of private experiences. - The change to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of phenomenological experiences - the objects remain, even if we have to talk in another language about them. Private language argument: should show how we accomplish this feat.
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I 337
Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: wrong: to exclude them because of the impossibility of intersubjective comparisons of private experiences. - One could have a private language in which one only speaks about his beetle - and refuses to translate it into the public language - that would be solipsism. - However, it would not be a unsuitable language philosophy.
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Explanation/(s):
Beetle-Example/Wittgenstein: assuming every human has a box with a beetle, which he never shows to anyone else. But he himself can always see if the bug is still in the box. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. Through this thing in the box it can be shortened. It lifts off, whatever it is." - The example shows that completely privately held entities do not exist as something objective > Private language > intersubjectivity..

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996


> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Private Language



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27