|Chisholm, Roderick M.
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|Propositions||I 16 (33)
Proposition/Chisholm: that, what changes when someone else says "I'm hungry" - Thesis: there is no proposition of the 1st person. "I'm F" - no properties like "sitting-next-to-someone". "living opposite" (impure predication) - no "nonplatonic entities": "the property of being identical with this thing" - primary form: not accepting propositions but self-attribution properties.
Proposition: Subtype of facts.
Properties/Chisholm: Problem: E.g. ""French" is not applicable to itself ": here one cannot say that it has the property, not to itself ... otherwise paradox - solution:" ... has not the property ... "- not every proposition corresponds to a property, therefore not every sentence expresses a proposition.
Proposition/Chisholm: if there is no property of the "sitting-next-to-someone", then there is also no proposition "someone sits next to this man", instead we can define them by properties, we just do not need them in addition.
Proposition/Chisholm: from the proposition "There is something that is F" does not follow that there is the property of being such that there is something that is F (E.g. round square). - Accepting a proposition: Considering that something ...
Proposition/Chisholm: real: e.g. "All human beings are mortal", "There are mountains", "two and two are four" but not: "Socrates is wise", "Emil stands" - attribution: no "accepting of propositions" - "Proper name-fallacy". To believe that there is a proposition "Emil stands" - just as unlikely as the property "to be identical with Emil".
Proposition/Chisholm: involves an eternal object (property or relation), and also a state of affairs. Sentence: does not involve an eternal object.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004