Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Lewis, David
 
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Propositions Frank I 17
Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true - Definition property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property - Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies - it makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes - but there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed A to proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time - e.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds - therefore no knowledge).
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Frank I 329
Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional) - Advantage: non-perspectivic access - ((s) not everyone has their own possible worlds.
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Frank I 355
Propositions: Have nothing intersubjective per se - problematic therefore subjectivity of reference of the first person.
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Lewis IV 137
Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times.
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IV 142
E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both.
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IV 142
E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference proposition/statement).
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IV 145
Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions.
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IV 146
Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties.
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V 160
Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - > inclusion, overlapping, etc.
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ad Stechow 42
Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds).

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29