Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Perry, John R.
 
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Propositions Frank I 396
Meaning/thought/PerryVsFrege: we must separate the meaning sharply from the thought- the thought is not a mental entity but corresponds to the informational content. - Meaning corresponds with the role of the words - the same role creates in every context another de re-proposition.
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I 409f
Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. - New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. - VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. - Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. - Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. - Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re" - then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". - Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. - Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I").
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I 455f
Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots) - nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. - Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. - Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul - VsExtra-sense: does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states - people understand sentences but do not form beliefs. - List of extra senses for everyone: too long - Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language - rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I"is doing this" - problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough - the same meaning cannot perform different references..

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


> Counter arguments against Perry
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-24