|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains in place even after singular term! - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in x0p.
Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!).
Modal logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = proposition.
Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? this denotes nothing.
Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (Gavagai) - Proposition eliminated: synonymy indefinable - scientific truth indefinable (only within the theory) (>§16).
Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different.
Proposition as bearers of truth: no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves.
Sentence: The door is open bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. - what could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there).
Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements.
Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition number of planets > 7 unequal Proposition 9 > 7.
Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even variable over object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary).
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - Quine: still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: to artificial.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003