Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Propositions I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains in place even after singular term! - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in x0p.
Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!).
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I 343
Modal logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = proposition.
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I 347
Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? this denotes nothing.
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I 355
Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (Gavagai) - Proposition eliminated: synonymy indefinable - scientific truth indefinable (only within the theory) (>§16).
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I 358
Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different.
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I 358
Proposition as bearers of truth: no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves.
Sentence: The door is open bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. - what could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there).
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VII 109
Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements.
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VII 157
Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition number of planets > 7 unequal Proposition 9 > 7.
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X 32
Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even variable over object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary).
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XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - Quine: still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: to artificial.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24