Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
Books on Amazon
Propositions II 274
E.g. Heimson/Perry/Searle: tightening: Heimson was Humes doppelganger on the twin earth, ecxcept for the micro-structure - the sentence has in both cases the same Fregean sense - but the propositions must be different because they have different truth values - so Fregean sense is not enough to determine which proposition is expressed - it cannot explain the indexicality - Kaplan: therefore different theory of propositions: "direct reference", "singular propositions": here the proposition is not the intentional content in the head of the speaker, but it has to contain the real object - SearleVs> see self-reference.
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V 144
SearleVsFrege: missed the distinction between sense and proposition -
Proposition/Searle: circumstances are necessary in addition to the terms.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27