## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Stalnaker, Robert Books on Amazon |
Propositions | I 35 Proposition/Structure/Possible world/Stalnaker: propositions are highly structured, possible worlds are not - the structures that exist between propositions, do not exist like that between possible worlds - propositions can be stronger or weaker - possible worlds cannot - a minimum theory of propositions and possible worlds needs only the structures of propositions, not of possible worlds. I 37 Proposition/Stalnaker: is made up of individuals and properties - sentence/Stalnaker: is made up of names and predicates. I 51 Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition cannot be understood like a sentence, because it is already the content. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: is no more than a sub-region, or subset of possible worlds - Def assertion: asserting a proposition is nothing else than to locate the real world in this subset - Def true-relative-to-x: to say, a Proposition is true relative to a possible world x means that the possible world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that constitutes the proposition - Def true simpliciter: is to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds that constitute the proposition) - Proposition: is identified with its truth conditions. I 191 Secondary Proposition/Two-dimensional semantics/Chalmers/Stalnaker: ("fx"): based on the real world - primary: ("fp") based on the particular world in which the statement is made - logical form: Def fp: logical Form: fx(y) = f(x,y) and fp(x) = f(x,x) or equivalent: fp(x) = fx(x). |
Sta I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-25