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|Propositional Attitudes||II 31
Propositional attitudes/attribution/ambiguity/Cresswell: 1. Thesis: sentences with propositional attitude are ambiguous - 2. Thesis: the ambiguity is located in the word "that" - that is, the ambiguity is not located in the attitude verb or somewhere in the complement sentence.
Propositional Attitude/that-sentence/ambiguity/Cresswell: this is always about whether "that" is applied to the whole following sentence, or to its parts (the references of the individual parts). The ambiguity lies not in a peculiarity of faith.
Object/propositional attitude/Cresswell: a) as a question of the meaning of the that-sentence. This is what this book is all about - b) Question, what makes the sentence true. Answer: that (1) is true, because Ambrose expresses a certain sentence- object: is then the sentence which Ambrose actually utters - that may have been quite different sentences. In any case, the sentence will represent that it will rain. - Definition object: is then a representation. - ((s) representation/(s): comes into play because it could have been different sentences.) Problem: the object of an attribution of propositional attitudes cannot be the meaning because we can understand it without knowing if it was exactly this sentence.
Definition object/attitude/propositional attitude/Terminology/Cresswell: I call the object of the attitude the sentence that is actually uttered. Fodor is concerned with objects. - Definition content: be the meaning of the that-sentence - it is about contents in this book - different objects (sentences) can have the same content.
Iterated propositional attitudes/Cresswell: E.g. Natasha believes that Mortimer believes ... - no problem: if "that" is applied to entire sentences (that0) - (similar to the double negation). - Problem: if the that is applied to individual structures - E.g. (see above) (7 + 5) + 2 - ((s) misleading) - no problem: if the + is a function of numbers (i.e. the referent of the digits) Problem: if + should operate on structures (= sense of numeric expressions).
Object/propositional attitude/Cresswell: the objects are not determined by the content. That is, that an explanation of action by desire/faith could sometimes be undefined - content: is simply not sufficient for a determination of the object.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984