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|Prosentential Theory||I 436
Definition pro-sententional theory of truth/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Brandom: is the result if you consider "is true" to be a syncategorematic part of pro-sentences. Analogy to pronouns. Savings - has the same semantic content as its anaphoric predecessor - recognizes its predecessor - e.g. "She stopped." Predecessor: Maria stopped. E.g. "for all you can say is true: if the policeman said it, then it is true".
Four Conditions for pro-sentences (analog to pronouns):
1) They must occupy all the grammatical positions (embedded and freestanding)
2) They are generic: every clause of statement may be the predecessor of a pro-sentence, e.g. He is standing, he is his F
3) They can be used quantificatorily
4) The class of the admissible substituent determines the significance of the pro-sentence - the anaphora is a relation between Tokenings. "This is true" is a response to a Tokening of "I am hungry". - E.g. "everything he said is true" is not accessible for simpler redundancy and quote redemption approaches.
Pro: it can explain complicated sentences: E.g. "Something that Hans said is either true, or it was said by Fritz".
Prosentential Theory/Brandom: "refers to" is a pro-sentence forming operator. - E.g. "The one Kissinger referred to as "almost third-rated mind" understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric predecessor is a particular quote by Kissinger - nominalization of sentences - ((s) Instead of describing a sentence - the name of a sentence).
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001