Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
Qua-Objects V 247
Qua-object/Qua object/Lewis: E.g. Russell qua philosopher is Russell-in-intension: the Russell in our world (actual world), together with the Russells who are its philosophical counterparts from other worlds - Within the actual world there is no difference - no differences between the two Russell-in-intension - i.e. we have identity -> relation-in-intension/((s): Identity) - ((s)> Cresswell: intensional objects: various objects in different worlds). - Pair of regions-in-intension: E.g. this event as a conference or as the scene of a struggle - but not two events - wrong, to say "the same and yet different".

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24