Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
Books on Amazon
Qualia I 284
Qualia/Searle: qualia is what you cannot have without feeling anything.
No qualia are: beliefs and other intentional states. You can have it without a certain feeling connected to them.
I 34
The supposed problem is now: how can functionalism explain Qualia? It cannot do it because it is tailored to a completely different subject area: it is about attributions from the point of view of the third person.
I 68
Qualia/reduction/reductionism/Searle: You cannot trace back intentional content (or pain, or qualia) to something else, because if you could, these things would be something else, but they are nothing else.
FodorVs: "in order that an intentional reference is real, it must in reality be something else".
Chalmers I 258
Disappearing Qualia/fading qualia/Searle: (Searle (1992)): E.g. suppose that in your own brain, more and more silicon chips are being installed and you notice how your qualia is dwindling and you want to write "I'm becoming blind!" But you hear yourself say "I see a red object before me".
Chalmers: the system might believe that something is wrong about itself. But only if the physical changes cause a magical interaction.
I 259
Chalmers: It is much more likely that the qualia will not disappear when replacing neurons with silicone chips.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29