Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Qualia, philosophy: qualia are the sensory-like correspondences to properties perceived on external objects or processes. Problems arise in connection with the explanation of their origin and their comparability between individuals. See also phenomena, sensory perception, sensations, perceptions, stimuli, qualities, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity, inverted spectra, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
J.R. Searle on Qualia - Dictionary of Arguments
I 284 Qualia/Searle: qualia is what you cannot have without feeling anything. No qualia are: beliefs and other intentional states. You can have these without a certain feeling connected to them. I 34 The supposed problem is now: how can functionalism explain qualia? It cannot do it because it is tailored to a completely different subject area: it is about attributions from the point of view of the third person. >Functionalism. I 68 Qualia/reduction/reductionism/Searle: You cannot trace back intentional content (or pain, or qualia) to something else, because if you could, these things would be something else, but they are nothing else. >Reductionism. FodorVs: "in order for an intentional reference to be real, it must in reality be something else". - - - Chalmers I 258 Disappearing Qualia/fading qualia/Searle: (Searle (1992)(1)): e.g. suppose that in your own brain, more and more silicon chips are being installed and you notice how your qualia is dwindling and you want to write "I'm becoming blind!" But you hear yourself say "I see a red object in front of me". Chalmers: the system might believe that something is wrong about itself. But only if the physical changes cause a magical interaction. I 259 Chalmers: it is much more likely that the qualia will not disappear when replacing neurons with silicone chips. 1. J. R. Searle: The rediscovery of the mind, Cambridge 1992._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20