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|Radical Interpretation||IV 70
Radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: 1) specify empirical evidence - 2) since different ways of selecting evidence lead to different truth theories, the choice must be justified by the RI theory. - Problem: the truth theory cannot be attributed regardless of the correctness of the meaning theory.
Evidence/Quine: everything that is accessible to RI - (language learning of the child, stimuli).
Similarity spaces/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: is not available to the radical interpreter - (because different culture must be assumed, other than in language learning).
Holism/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: his argument for holism is based on his assumption that individual sentences - E.g. Kurt belongs to the German-speaking Community and Kurt holds true: It s raining on Saturday afternoon and it s raining around Kurt on Saturday afternoon - law-like (laws). - Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the generalizations thereof E.g. (x)(t)(if x belongs to the German-speaking community, then (x holds it rains to be true at t iff it is raining in the vicinity of x at t) - do not support counterfactual conditionals and are therefore not law-like according to Davidson s Def law - no support of Counterfactual Conditionals e.g. the meaning of it s raining could be: the cat is on the mat - then it does not follow that the cat is not on the mat when it is not raining .
Solution: ...for a relation R and every speaker S... - then nomological - but not yet RI - lawlikeness: we only had to assume it because of conventionality of language. - problem: by definition, RI cannot find out the conventionality.
RI/Fodor/Lepore: our image of RI is much richer than that of Davidson.
Problem: the nomological approach is not holistic.
Conventionality/language/RI/Fodor/Lepore: by definition, C. is nothing that the radical interpreter can find out! - E.g. non-German-seakers don t say "Hund" when the are referring to a dog.
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992