Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty, Richard
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Radical Interpretation Horwich I 449
RI/Davidson/Rorty: only way to set up oneself outside of the language game. - Question: how does the external observer use the word true? - Problem. despite Quine’s task of distinguishing between synthetic/analytical the distinction between physical objects and stimuli is useless - problem: one needs to know something about the beliefs of the natives before knowing anything about their meanings - Rorty: with that he is set to coherence.
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with RI makes correspondence relation, intended beliefs, etc. unnecessary.
Rorty VI 33
RI/proposition/Davidson/Rorty: after a while: step from non-propositions (one does not know the speaker’s meaning, but registers agreement and disagreement) to propositions.
VI 38
Justification/PdN/belief/behavior/truth/Davidson/Rorty: the need to justify our beliefs to ourselves produces a pattern of behavior - we have to perceive this in others in order to attribute beliefs to them - truth is not necessary as an additional standard for this.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25