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|Radical Interpretation||Horwich I 449
RI/Davidson/Rorty: only way to set up oneself outside of the language game. - Question: how does the external observer use the word true? - Problem. despite Quine’s task of distinguishing between synthetic/analytical the distinction between physical objects and stimuli is useless - problem: one needs to know something about the beliefs of the natives before knowing anything about their meanings - Rorty: with that he is set to coherence.
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with RI makes correspondence relation, intended beliefs, etc. unnecessary.
Rorty VI 33
RI/proposition/Davidson/Rorty: after a while: step from non-propositions (one does not know the speaker’s meaning, but registers agreement and disagreement) to propositions.
Justification/PdN/belief/behavior/truth/Davidson/Rorty: the need to justify our beliefs to ourselves produces a pattern of behavior - we have to perceive this in others in order to attribute beliefs to them - truth is not necessary as an additional standard for this.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994