Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
Ramsey Sentence IV 78
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: eliminates theoretical terms in favor of bound variables. - "Carnap conditional: then divides the theory into two parts: a) analytical part of the theory: partial interpretation of the theoretical terms - b) synthetic part: the theoretical terms are eliminated here.
IV 81
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: says nothing more than that the theory is implemented - "Carnap sentence: is neutral as to whether it is implemented - Carnap sentence is a conditional of the Ramsey sentence and of the postulate of the theory - 1) the postulate: is logically equivalent to the conjunction of Ramsey and Carnap sentence - 2) the Ramsey sentence and the postulate imply exactly the same sentences in old theory -" 3) Carnap sentence implies no sentences of the old theory except logical truths -" Ramsey sentence: could simply replace the postulate (the new theory in a sentence).
Carnap: proposes to take the Ramsey sentence as synthetic postulate of T and the Carnap sentence as an analytical postulate of T - They share the work of the original postulate - postulate/Carnap: systematized the O sentences (old theory) and partially interpreted the theoretical terms.
IV 89
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: states that a theory has at least one implementation - this is weaker than our extended postulate/Lewis: this implies that the theory has been implemented once.
IV 259
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification - "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension.
Schw I 218
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. banana theory: there are things that are long-ish yellow fruits (can turn out to be wrong) -" Carnap-conditional: if there are things that are long-ish ..., then bananas are long-ish ...-" cannot turn out to be wrong (is analytical).

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23