Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Fodor, Jerry
Books on Amazon
Rationality IV 15
Rationality/rationality/law/Fodor/Lepore: nothing that would comply with a law of precise science will decide what is rational or irrational.
IV 117
Rationality/Fodor/Lepore restricts believe attribution: one cannot believe that p and the same time believe that not-p - but not for content: you can have contradictory content - even contradictory prop. att.s possible - meaning not rationalistically limited either: one sentence can express p and not-p at the same time - Wishes: can be contradictory.
IV 130
Intentional attribution: not limited by rationality, because representations may be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic - Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states - constitutive of belief: rationality: not at the same time p and not-p - but objects of intentional states may be contradictory.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28