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Mind/brain/room/McGinn: while the brain is three-dimensional, the mind cannot be defined spatially in this way. How can this mind then be identical to the brain?
Representation/sensation/McGinn: the spatiality of the world is something that our impressions never lack.
Mirrors are for the sense of sight, but not for the sense of touch! Also not for hearing, smelling and tasting. But these are also space-dependent, though not as strong as seeing.
Our consciousness is not spatially. Consciousness itself is not physically perceptible. It enables us to perceive the world, but it itself is not so noticeable.
The mind is not spatially, so the senses cannot respond to it in principle.
Space/consciousness/materialism: denies that consciousness is not spatial.
Mind/brain/McGinn: Thesis: the key is that the brain itself is not the simple spatial condition, for which we take it.
Originally pre-spatial properties (before the Big Bang) would therefore (assuming physical conservation) be cause of matter and mind.
Consciousness/Big Bang/McGinn: Thesis: consciousness is sort of a fossil of the early universe. (Before the Big Bang.) It must entail reminiscences of this far past time.
Thesis: perhaps the space has a (hidden) structure, which puts it in a position to unite mind and matter in itself.
This space gives the mind a home, because it needs one. Somewhere.
Mind, unlike numbers, is causally correlated with matter in space, so it cannot be entirely located outside the space.
Now, if space is something that contains all causally linked things, then the conscious mind must be present in any sense in the space.
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001