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|Space||Hintikka I 90/91
Language/object/phenomenological/Wittgenstein/early/Hintikka: in the early Wittgenstein the language is based on the visual space and deals with immediately given phenomena. We can see that in the writings of the middle period.
Room/field/absolute/localization/individuation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there must be absolute points in visual space, otherwise one could not tell if a spot remains in the same place or not - that is, points in visual space have a logical form - (1931) - Hintikka: therefore they can be Tractatus objects.
Subjective/subjectivity/Wittgenstein: "..another does not see the objects in the same way as I do. Does this mean that the visual space, I am talking about is mine? So that it is subjective?
No: it has been merely seen subjective here, and it is opposed to an objective space, but which is only a construction, with the visual space as a base "(VII 71, 100).
I 110 ff
Subject/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Question: if the objects of the Tractatus are really objects of acquaintance (direct experience) why has Wittgenstein never mentioned this?
Tractatus 2.0131 "the spatial object must lie in the infinite space. (A point in space is an argument place). Although the spot in the visual field does not need to be red, but it must have a color, it has, so to speak, a color space around it.
I 167 ff
Space/Space terms/logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the same incompatibility (incompatibility as of the color terms) is also raised by the space concepts). The same color spot cannot be located at different places of the room.
Wittgenstein: But that is no problem. The space is for him a form of spatial objects. (Tractatus 2.0251: "Space and time are forms of objects".)
Space/visual space/absolute/location/individuation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there must be absolute points in the visual space, otherwise you could not tell if a spot remains in the same place or not - that is, points in visual space have a logical form - (1931) - Hintikka: therefore they can be Tractatus objects.
Visual space/seeing/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the visual space has its independent reality - it itself has no subject - it is autonomous.
Infinite divisibility and space/Wittgenstein: it has been asserted that space is not infinitely divisible. However, regarding the possibilities of the experiment one cannot prove anything.
Search/explore/invent/Wittgenstein: a space is not searched for - searched are things in space. - The room is everything, which one must be certain about in order to ask a question - what you look for, must be fully describable. - On the contrary: logical discovery: different from finding something in the space. - If we could describe this, we would have already found it.
Space/visual space/Wittgenstein: a) visual space: here it is pointless to say something would look like, as if it were further away than the moon - b) physical space: here it makes sense - if we saw how the moon gets smaller, we could not say that it goes away in the visual space, but in the physical - this is a distinction between sense-data and physical object - but useful in both spaces: that A of B is equidistant from C. - We do not need a theory to bring our knowledge of sense data with beliefs about objects in compliance - additionally, what we mean when we say "the penny is round" could also mean that it looks elliptical. - Visual space: here, a circular piece canot look straight - physical space: here it can look straight.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996