Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Realism I 249ff
Truth/Realism/Field: does not want to claim truth as a metaphorical concept about the theory but instead the theory itself. - The existence of mathematical entities follows from the theory itself, not from the truth of the theory (in the sense of correspondence theory).
II 120
Realism/Variant/Field: here: Thesis: "There are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a T-concept to generalize. (> Infinite conjunction/disjunction). - Anti-realism/variant: would be the opposite position here: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. - (> ideal justification).
Horwich I 405 f
Metaphysical Realism/Field: three game styles. Metaphysical realism 1: there are mind-independent objects - metaphysical realism 2: There is only one correct description (FieldVs) - metaphysical realism 3: correspondence theory - a refutation of metaphysical realism 3 is not yet one of metaphysical realism 1.
I 414
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: Thesis: metaphysical realism leads to a dichotomy facts/values. -> Relativism - this refutes itself. - Dichotomy between evaluative (pseudo-facts, nonfactual) and non-evaluative facts. - FieldVsPutnam/Field per relativism: we can refer the relativism to purely evaluative statements (not facts). - Garfinkel: the relativism itself is no valuation. - Internal Realism/Putnam: our standards of rationality are objectively correct.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Realism

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29