Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Putnam, Hilary
 
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Realism Rorty I 305ff
Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct description of a solid inventory, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals - PutnamVsAnti-realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. - Internal realism. (according to Rorty): position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment"(Putnam): - By means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. PutnamVsRealismus/PutnamVsRelativismus/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language.
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Horwich I 389
Realism/Putnam: explains why theories tend to convergence. - Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world.
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Horwich I 395 f
Realism/fact/Putnam: E.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points - that is, into smaller and smaller segments - then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments - Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. - "Hard core" -Realism: would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. - PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions.
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Horwich I 398
Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - that says Quine in ontological relativity.
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Horwich I 404
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) He has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention.
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Putnam I 78
Realism/Putnam: he must left it inexplicable that E.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. - What has prediction to do with truth then?
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I 95
Realism: realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory.
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I 175f
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: faces infinitely many correspondences - endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. - Problem: to choose the right, without a metaphysical access. ((S)> Loewenheim).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


> Counter arguments against Putnam
> Counter arguments in relation to Realism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28