|Searle, John R.
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Realism/SearleVsNaive: is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. - But he overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content.
Realism/Searle: no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. I
am set to the background - Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses - being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
External Realism/Searle: must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars)- e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent.
Realism/Searle: thesis says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
Realism/Searle: should not be confused with correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth - it is a condition for our hypotheses - it is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true" - no semantic theory - Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint -SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate.
Searle: realism is not a theory of language - VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. - Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true.- Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are.
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. - The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") - would be a property of that representation-independent reality.
External Realism/Searle: is a condition for understanding other hypotheses.
Realism/Searle: says that there is an independent reality, but nothing about how it
is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses - realism as part of the background.
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983