Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Searle, John R.
 
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Realism II 87
Realism/SearleVsNaive: is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. - But he overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content.
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II 199
Realism/Searle: no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. I
am set to the background - Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses - being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
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III 160f
External Realism/Searle: must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars)- e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent.
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III 165
Realism/Searle: thesis says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
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III 163f
Realism/Searle: should not be confused with correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth - it is a condition for our hypotheses - it is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true" - no semantic theory - Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint -SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate.
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III 165
Searle: realism is not a theory of language - VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. - Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true.- Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are.
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III 166
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. - The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") - would be a property of that representation-independent reality.
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III 191
External Realism/Searle: is a condition for understanding other hypotheses.
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III 169
Realism/Searle: says that there is an independent reality, but nothing about how it
is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
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III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses - realism as part of the background.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Realism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28