Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism. Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Justification - Dictionary of Arguments
I 44 Justification/FieldVsWright: one can justify any belief by a stronger belief, from which it follows. >Stronger/weaker, >Beliefs. II 366f Rationality/justification/Field: pro a lower threshold: then good induction rules and perception rules count as a priori weak. >Rationality. Coherence theory/Field: Coherence theory has a higher threshold for rationality. >Coherence, >Coherence theory. Our rules are not considered reasonable before the user has not shown by a combination of deduction, induction and perception, where the combination varies from case to case, that these rules are reliable. >Covariance, >Reliability, >Reason, >Sense, >Senseless, >Rules, >Deduction, >Induction, >Perception._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |