Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Chisholm on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
I 51 Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. 1) The one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2) He must understand propositions and facts; Direct attribution (self-attribution) is the original form of all attribution. I 133 But this is not yet self-consciousness: in addition, we need knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. >Self-consciousness, >Self-ascription. --- II 24 real/Rutte: for calling something real: conditions: 1) this way of appearing, - 2) arranged in the way it appears - 3) the right causation. - Reality must be distinguished from the outside the world. >World. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 - - - II 112/113 Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience II 105f Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign. BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy. Directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. >Behaviorism, >Psychologism. II 107 "Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. >Intentionality. II 108 Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance).>Acquaintance. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. >Domains, >Use, >Mention. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16