Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Reference, in philosophy: relation of a linguistic expression or action to a real object. Reference presupposes the existence of this object. An expression, which corresponds to no object, has no reference, however, may have a meaning. See also unicorn, Pegasus.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Chisholm, Roderick M.
 
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Reference I 51
Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution. - 1. the one who means must be able to make himself an object; 2. He must understand propositions and facts; - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attribution.
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I 133
But not yet self-consciousness: in addition, knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed.
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 112/113
Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience.
II 24
really / Rutte: 1 this way of appearing, - 2 arranged in the way it appears - 3rd the right causation - reality must be distinguished from the outside world.

II 105f
Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign - BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy - directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. - A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism.
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II 107
"Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality.
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II 108
Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance) - QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Reference



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26