Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Reference, in philosophy: relation of a linguistic expression or action to a real object. Reference presupposes the existence of this object. An expression, which corresponds to no object, has no reference, however, may have a meaning. See also unicorn, Pegasus.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
Books on Amazon
Reference I 71
Reference/Kripke: the reference of the name is not determined by a description, but by a "causal" chain of communication.
I 109
Kripke: the relevant element is the actual chain of communication, not the way the speaker came about his reference.
I 123
Baptism: correct causal chain, but: added conditions, no personal knowledge.
It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identifying the specific characteristics, through certain properties that the referee alone meets and of which the speaker knows or believes that they apply.
I 147f
Reference: "water is H2O", "light is a photon flux" or "heat is the motion of molecules": if I refer to heat, then I do not refer to an inner sensation someone may have, but to external phenomenon which we perceive through our sense of perception. It caused the characteristic sensation that we call the sensation of heat.
I 149
Reference: we determine what light is by the fact that it is the one thing in the outside world that affects our eyes in a certain way.
I 154
In the case of proper names, the reference can be defined in various ways.
Establishing reference: A priori (contingent) - not synonymous.
Meaning: analytic (required)
Definition: specifies reference and expresses truth a priori.
- - -
Wolf II 211
Reference/E.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Kripke: variant: the (absent) husband is not nice. - Then the statement is false for all authors - (because of the absent husband) - distinction speaker reference/semantic reference.
Wolf II 221
Gödel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: Description does not determine the reference - we would not withdraw the name when we learn something new.
Wolf II 231f
Kripke thesis: Donnellan's distinction referential/attributive - generalized: a speaker can believe that his specific intention coincides with his general intention in a situation for one of two reasons: a) "simple" case: his specific intention is to refer to the semantic referee, (by definition)(that is Donnellan's attributive use) - b) "complex" case: the intentions are different, but the speaker believes that they refer to the same object. (referential) - VsDonnellan: one must not understand the referential as proper names - the distinction simple/complex is equally applicable to descriptions and names.
Newen/Schrenk I 111
Direct reference/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: Kripke calls the object theory of names the theory of direct reference.

S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29