|Reference, in philosophy: relation of a linguistic expression or action to a real object. Reference presupposes the existence of this object. An expression, which corresponds to no object, has no reference, however, may have a meaning. See also unicorn, Pegasus.|
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Proposition/Sentence/Truth/knowledge/Identification/Evans: (1982, 31) E.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is - i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence.
Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object: a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (>Kripke) - b) indirectly through our sensing (>Frege) and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things (IT) - Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion? - SearleVsMill: -direct Reference- (without intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties. - Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. - ((s) could have been different).
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003