Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Books on Amazon
Rules Wright I 287
Addition/arithmetic/Wittgenstein stigmatizes an "ideal-rigid machine" or a "philosophical superlative" of the rules, namely the idea that such a purely conceptual unity and disunity are not based in an ontological way on facts that lie in human nature.
Wright: better: we have to allow that such things are fixedly determined in a way that people might in principle not realize but that they still leave room for the idea that their constitution itself is somehow dependent upon the changing circumstances in the context of sub-cognitive abilities of people.
Newen/Schrenk I 32
Rules/Wittgenstein: (use theory): rules are central, because the use is usually very stable.
Hintikka I 242
Rules/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: Problem: rules must not become a "central entity" - Blue Book: Rules are not mere drill - instead: the rule is incorporated in the understanding, obeying, etc. - later Vs: Problem: that leads to regress. - Later: Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242: to follow a rule is analog to following a command.
I 340
Rules/language game/language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: language games take precedence over rules.
II 62
Rule/music/Wittgenstein: the rule neither exists in the result of playing, nor in the result plus score. - But in the intention to play the score - the rule is included in all individual cases - it cannot be isolated, therefore.
II 106
Rule/reality/world/Wittgenstein: a rule is not in relation to the reality so that we could see if they match or not - we make the grammar of color words not according to the model of reality - otherwise you could say: "these properties have this kind of grammar" - applicable rules for "red", etc. are not to be justified by anything that can be said about colors.
II 113
Rule/Wittgenstein: contradictions exist between rules - not between a rule and the reality.
II 201
Meaning/rule/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein: a (single) rule is not sufficient to indicate the meaning - such a rule would be given by an ostensive definition - therefore an ostensive definition is not a definition - not sufficient: E.g. "This is soz" - solution:. sufficient: "This color is soz" it must be clear for what kind of thing the word stands - N.B.: differentia/genus: problem: how can we decide what the genus is?
II 251
Rule/Law of Natural/Wittgenstein: Rules are not rigid as laws of nature (NG) - natural laws: are independent of us.
II 346
Rule/Wittgenstein: no prohibition or permission - no statement.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Rules

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24