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|Rule Following||Newen/Schrenk I 35
Rule-following/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: is a competence - without justification or consideration - rule: not fixed, but something that we feel bound to. - VsWittgenstein: Problem: uncertainty of usages.
Stegmüller IV 120
Rule-following/Wittgenstein: assertibility conditions are impossible for private rule-following because community does not exist.
Hintikka I 243
Rule/Philosophical Investigations/Wittgenstein: rule-following is nothing more than acting in accordance with a rule.
This view is rejected by Wittgenstein initially: in the Blue Book, he rejects the view, the teaching of language is a mere drill.
For the logically-thought out language use applies, "that the rule is included in the understanding, obeying, etc., if the symbol for the rule forms part of the calculation."
Vs: Problem: so Wittgenstein is not satisfied in the long run, because it leads to regress .. How do we know that we follow the signs correctly? What does it mean to follow the sign expression of a rule?
Later, Philosophical Investigations §§ 143 242: following a rule is analog to: following a command.
One is trained to it and one responds to it in a certain way.
Problem: what if one reacts differently to a command and drill? Who is right then? The common human behavior is the reference system (i.e., not behaviour, which would be common for all humanity, on the contrary, his writings contain many references that Wittgenstein is relativist in terms of language and culture.)
With this last remark Wittgenstein gives a different answer than in the Blue Book or the Philosophical Remarks.
Rule/rule-following/late/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: new: it is suspected that someone does not really follow the rule but only acts ((s) randomly) in accordance with it, Wittgenstein later does not want to raise the question whether the person concerned thinks of a certain sign formulation, or what role a specific codification of the rule plays. He wants to get to that with the late formulation: "God, if he had looked into our souls, he would have not been able to see of whom we were talking."
Whether I act perhaps out of fear rather than in accordance with the rule (with the same result) I do not determine, in looking into my soul, but: by asking: "Has he ever been trained to perform commands? Ultimately, the answer can only come from the community framework of behaviors that are common to me and the other.
Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein calls this broader horizon language game. Only in this context questions of the rule-following can be posed usefully.
The task of the actually played language games cannot be satisfied by rules as far as their linguistic or symbolic expressions are concerned with these.
The rule-following can only be understood in terms of language games.
Certain psychological words express no conscious processes: for example, "understand" in the expression "to understand a rule." > Consciousness.
The rule-following is not based on criteria.
Rule-following/Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations § 202: "Following the rule" is a practice. And believing to follow the rule is not following the rule."
Rule-following/Wittgenstein: "following rules" is an ambiguous term. 100 lines on the blackboard are equal to 101 lines in the visual space.
Rule-following/rule/game/Wittgenstein: if one sets the rules for a game, then one does not really follow them during playing. Chess is not played with constant reference to the rules.
But one cannot say, either one is merely a parrot or one looks up the rules. The matter is much more complicated. Why are primitive games without rules called games?
Series/following/Wittgenstein: Knowing how the sequel is, is never only seeing a formula - one also needs the experience that he continues the series.
Rule-following/Wittgenstein/Schulte: is a practice, therefore you cannot follow a rule "privately". Otherwise "believing to follow the rule" would be the same.
Rule-following/private/Wittgenstein/Schulte: It does not make sense to say that a human has followed a rule once. It would have to be part of an institutionalized practice.
But it is so, that some authors, such as Descartes have stood for a similar position (private language). (VI 193/94).
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996