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|Regularity Theory||III 17
Naïve Regularity Theory/Armstrong: Target: distinguish cosmic uniformities against accidental ones - Problem: there are only uniformities, therefore all laws are only GF, so all GF are laws - KnealeVs: then it would be a law that there can be no white ravens (they would be physically impossible) - E.g. the fact that there is no lump of uranium 1 Km in diameter would not be a law, but there can be no unrealized physical possibilities (equally, there would be no lump of gold of that size) (for indistinguishable reasons). - Problem: because there are no centaurs, it would likewise be a law that they are smart and that they are stupid - no conceptual contradiction! - Regularity theory: does not recognize any relation between universals.
Regularity Theory/Armstrong: can infer only from observed to unobserved cases and has less available for that than we have: no laws! - If it logical possibility (E.g. 99% of the observed ... so...), then it cannot exclude E.g. grue - (same probability for grue and green) - in order to exclude grue, the regularity theory needs universals.
Refined regularity theory: 1) Epistemic Solution: Criteria for good/bad regularity: a) external, problem: cognitive attitude decides - internal: "objectivist": Skyrms: resilience, b) Ramsey-Lewis: criterion external for the individual GF, but internal for the class of regularity.
AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983