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Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity.
Representation> de re attribution.
Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic.
The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting.
Rorty VI 179 ff
Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson.
Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (metaphysics).
Bandom I 127
Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map - VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them.
Representation is not an expression.
VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding.
BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content.
Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind.
Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented - four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" - 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts - 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel - 4) Correctness of judgment and inference.
I 412 ~
BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role.
Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content.
Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality.
Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain - b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities.
Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one.
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000