Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Davidson, Donald
 
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Representation II 126
Davidson: there is no representation that could be true/false. - Beliefs are true if they are caused properly.
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Dav I 96
DavidsonVsSchema/Content - DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation always in relation to a schema. - DavidsonVsSense data theory
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II 126
Representation/DavidsonVsPresentation Mind/Object - (VsSkepticism) - Davidson: there are no facts. ((s) Like Frege: all true propositions have the same meaning: conformity with all facts of the world/"great fact").
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II 127
There are no facts (no facts) that could be represented. - We do not know anything through the demand for correspondence.
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II 127
Representation/Externalism/DavidsonVsRepresentation: Davidson replaces private representations by intersubjectively accessible objects. - These are as public as the meanings.
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Rorty VI 190
Representation/Brandom/Rorty: would like to save them from Davidson, who has thrown them out with the bathing water - DavidsonVsRepresentation - VsVs: propositional contents are not possible without representations. - No proposition without representation.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29