Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty, Richard
 
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Richard Rorty
Representation I 162
Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions) - SellarsVsLocke: puts both together.
I 278~
R: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions!
But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists.
II 76
Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey - later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality.
II 112
PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented.
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation.
VI 45
R/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism.
VI 51
R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense -
VI 49
R/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance.
VI 54
Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.) - RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii.
VI 63
R/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world -
VI 71~
Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs.
R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs).
DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.)
VI 107f
R/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians.
But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former?
VI 125 f
RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us!
VI 130
Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything.
VI 139
Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling.
VI 140
Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. - (Taylor: handling) - Coping is more primary than representation. - Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Rorty
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28