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|Rylean Ancestors||V 91
Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? - Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions - Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts.
Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. - Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior - 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. - We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology.
VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience.
Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions.
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001