Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sentences: sentences are linguistic forms for expressing existent or non-existent issues of conditions, wishes, questions or commands. Statements can be true or false, unlike other forms of sentences like questions or single words. See also subsentential, truth, statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Sentences - Dictionary of Arguments
II 190 Structure/sentence structure/Field: is useful to give a semantics of indefinite expressions: Structure m for a sentence is a function that maps each name or mass term of the sentence to an object or quantity, and each predicate to a set. >Mapping, >Analysis, >Structures, >Singular terms, >General terms, >Predicates, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Quantification. Structure m corresponds to the sentence if any name, any mass term and each predicate partially denotes the thing, m attributes to it. >Partial denotation. Definition of truth by structure-truth: E.g. mass: both times regardless of the reference frame, but once relativistic mass, once dead weight. Then the proposition that mass is independent of the reference frame is once true, once false. >Truth/Field, >Meaning change, >Theory change._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16