Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Scheme/content: Scheme refers to the underlying structure or framework of our experience. It is the system of concepts, categories, and relationships that we use to make sense of the world around us. Content refers to the specific information or data that we experience. See also Conceptual schemes, Language and thought, Concepts, World/Thinking, Content, Thought content, Conceptual content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
J.R. Searle on Scheme/Content - Dictionary of Arguments
III 176f Scheme/Schema/Searle: that truth and falsehood change with schemata, does not mean that the reality changes. >Conceptual schemes. III 161 Def conceptual relativism/Searle: systems of representation such as vocabularies and conceptual schemata are human creations and therefore arbitrary. (Some philosophers believe that this is a problem for realism). >Realism/Searle, >Reference system. III 177 Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family resemblance, open texture, contextuality, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of theory by the evidence. But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent representations! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme! >Reality7Searle, >Truth/Searle. III 185 Every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others. It is always bound within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
||
> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Scheme/Content
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16