Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Books on Amazon
Pain Hintikka I 339
Pain/sensation/error/delusion/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: I cannot systematically deceive myself in identifying my feelings - the connection to the public language is logical (conceptual), not empirical. - ((s)> Davidson).
Pain/blue book/criterion: E.g. how I explain my toothache to someone else: I hold my jaw.
E.g. Supposing I observe, in certain cases, that someone has a red spot on the jaw. I would then conclude that certain phenomena always occured with the appearance of the red spot. ...
I 264
How do you know that someone has a toothache, if he holds his jaw? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, that is, we have arrived at the conventions.
These "conventions" are exactly the same what Wittgenstein calls elsewhere in this discussion "criteria". They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of expression "toothache".
"Using a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. I do not identify my sensation through criteria but I use the same expression.
I 265
Behavior/language/meaning/Wittgenstein/Philosophical examination/Hintikka: if one teaches a child the word "pain", so one teaches the child a new pain-behavior.
The word expression replaces crying and does not describe it.
But if that is so, the use of the word "pain" can be as little related to criteria such as the crying of the child is based on criteria.
I 267
Pain/Wittgenstein/late: there is simply no criterion for pain. Criteria are only criteria because of the language game, whose "steps" they are. Only in the language game of spontaneous pain expression a distorted face is a "criterion".
I 321
Picture/terminology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not like the term "picture" in the Philosophical Investigation ยง 301 anymore: "An idea is not a picture but a picture may correspond to it." "To say: the picture of pain enters the language game with the word "pain", is a misunderstanding. The idea of pain is not a picture but the idea of pain well enters in a sense the language game, just not as a picture..."
II 166f
Pain/Wittgenstein: we certainly have criteria for real pain as opposed to feigned in others. - It is not so that we can only know foreign pain indirectly like we e.g. cannot see the content of a foreign purse - meaningful: "His pain is worse than mine" - pointless: "two people cannot have the same pain." - Pointless: if there is no criterion - then it is meaningless to speak of ignorance.
II 172
Pain: Does not refer to an owner. - One might as well say "There is pain".
II 173
The location of the pain sensation has nothing to do with the person.
VI 184
Pain/Wittgenstein/Schulte: for pain, I distinguish intensity - not owners.
Bubner I 212
Pain/Wittgenstein/Bubner: is not the actual object of investigation, otherwise the psychical would be declared a realm of objects of its own kind.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-01