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Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role - the content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it - Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. - E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper.
Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance - it’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>Veridical).
Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process.
Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself.
Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (1972) LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid.
Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991