|Strawson, Peter F.
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|Self- Consciousness||Frank I 41ff
Self-consciousness/Strawson: M-predicates: do not presuppose consciousness to which they are attributed - P-predicates: (psychological): imply that the person to whom they are attributed, knows this - Definition P*-predicates/Shoemaker: it is impossible that any other subject, except me, can have certain properties.
Strawson I 130
I/self-consciousness/Strawson: previously only: all my experiences are specifically related to the body M, this one is distinguished by that - but the same goes for all other bodies in each case - problem: what does the word "mine" has to do in it?
Uniqueness of the body is no guarantee of Cartesian soul - solution: we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (but not fundamental) concept.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994