Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Situations, philosophy: a situation is a more or less definable constellation of objects, actors, states, events, information and information channels. See also state, process, action, relations, descriptions, communication, context/context dependency, information, meaning, situation semantics, possible worlds, centered worlds, fine grained/coarse grained._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Situation - Dictionary of Arguments
Place II 53 Situations/ontology/Armstrong: states provide a "super category" in the sense that situations include features, and features include properties and relations. - Place per. - But: Situation/Place: particulars do not include exactly the properties, which they "carry". - Also properties do not include situations which consist in the fact that something has these properties. - One should not distinguish between simple and compound situations: e.g. cat on the mat + eats - but "on the mat or in bed": is made true by the one or the other situation. >Truthmakers, >Properties._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Situations
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16