Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Carnap, Rudolf
Books on Amazon
Skepticism Stroud I 170
CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Carnap: Thesis: we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if an appropriate sensation is possible for us - if we can determine the truth of the corresponding sentences. - Then we have to determine a sphere within which this is possible.
Stroud I 173
Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: E.g. the sentence: "No one will ever know if __." Here the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because unverifiable - Meaningless: neither true nor false - then the question "Are there external things?" would be pointless, because neither true nor false. - Useful, however: internal questions: questions of existence within an area of ​​knowledge. - Within an area of ​​knowledge: the same sentence can be produced - i.e. the syntax is not decisive. - Sense: something that is true cannot contradict something that is meaningless. - CarnapVsSkepticsm: meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable.
I 179
Descartes: has the same explanation for the truth of skepticism as Carnap for its futility: the lack of verifiability of empirical existence statements.
Stroud I 187
CarnapVsSkepticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic frame (reference system) - Knowledge/Carnap: Two components: 1) Experience - 2) Linguistic frame (reference system), within which we understand the experience.
I 188
The only theoretical question is that about the rules of the system. - Mother Tongue/Carnap: we do not choose it - therefore, it reflects no thesis about the existence of the outside world. - Decision: if we continue to use it. - Problem: because it is a decision there are no objective facts that make it.
Stroud I 191
Skepticism/Reference System/StroudVsCarnap: introduces a "we" and experience as something that happens to us - The fact that we exist and have experience cannot just be regarded as an "internal" truth of the thing language.
Stroud I 193ff
StroudVsCarnap: either leads to idealism or to metaphysical realism or to skepticism all three of which he rejects - because of the futility of external questions.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24