Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
McGinn, Colin
Books on Amazon
Skepticism I 152
1. The general problem of skepticism: the reasons for our knowledge claims remain miserably behind the content of this claim. Problem of lacking. The input is not sufficient to justify the output.
2. Specific knowledge problems: are ahead of the skepticism : how do we get to the "a priori" knowledge?
I 174f
Skepticism: a) skepticism of the first person: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience.
b) skepticism of the third person: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat, permeated by nerves, make an image of the outside world?
McGinnVsSkepticism: Takes advantage of the idea, there would be a metaphysical gap between subject and knowledge object.
  a) For position of the first-person between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world
  b) For the position of the third person: the gap is seen as a part of the objective world which would face another part of the world, while both parts have their own characteristics.
I 176
We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps of knowledge are not as detrimental as it seems.
I 177
Knowledge/Transcendental Naturalism/TN: claims that the gaps are ultimately gaps in our understanding ability. Its origin is of epistemological, not of ontological kind.
I 196
The skeptic misinterprets our principled disability on the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basis level.

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29